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A. CASES: 
i i 
STATEMENT CF THE CASE 1 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
GMAC file April 24, 2009 a four (4) paoe complaint,(OT 1.::-n 
each of the first four pages, numbered "Page 4", oo which were 
attached two (2) unmarked exhbits, the first a one sheet document 
with the top printed "POP ELECTRONIC TITLE DOCUMENTS~' and the 
second (CT 6-7) a reduced in size copy of a purported elongated 
printea form entitled: RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT, GMAC 
FLEXIBLE FINANCE PLAN, for buyer CINDY LEE BACH, 10 North 27TH ST, 
BILLINGS YELLOWSTON, MT 59103 from Dealer, RESSLER MOTOR COMPANY, 
L&#% W. MAIN BOSEMAND, MT. 59713-0400, Hand written in the upper 
right corner was 11 021 /9/0434159." 
At'lhe bottom, inside an elongated rectangular outline, · 
there was/were no indications to what/which of the four printed 
names of finance companies, the purpored contract, if any, was 
to be or was in fact assigned. (CT: 6) But in the lower right 
portion of the outlined portion in the boxed section Assigned 
without recourse or with limited rec@urse, were the typed words: 
"RESSLER ·.MOTOR COMPANY, (followed by a difficult to read 
signature) and the ONLY written word, "Finance." 
The Plaintiff's complaint was: l) labelled only as: 
" C OM P L A I N T F O R C L A I M A N D D E L I V E R Y ( I . . 8 - 3 0 l ) (• C T . l ) ; 2 ) P u r • 
portedly in Arzona, Marcipa Countery, "?Oday of April, 2009", 
by a Kathleen Fitzgerald, whose named was first handprintd, 
the handwritten number "20" appears twice in the verification, 
(CT$) re the date of April, 2009; and the complaint itself is 
purportly singed two (2)days earlier on "22 day of April 2009 
- l -
by Laur1 E. Burri, Attroney for Plaintiff, (Ct: 3) 
The foregoing verification by Kathleen Fitzgerald, 
in Maricopa County, Arizona reads in the only two paragraphs 
thereof: 
"That I am an employee of Semperian, Inc., agent for 
GeneraT Motors Acceptance Corporation and am actively engaged 
in the operations of said corporation and has personal know-
ledge of the facts contained herein. 
Taat I have read the within and foregoing complaint, 
knows the contents thereof and believes the facts therein 
stated to be true and correct and makes this verification 
th i s date 1 behalf of the corpora ti on . " ( CT 4 )( Emphasis added) 
(Then follows the date: "Dated this :JI)_ day of April, 2009.") 
On May 27, 2009, Defendant JOHN N. BACH, filed a NOTICE 
OF MOTION & MOTION ... SPECIALLY APPEARING TO STRIKE, VOID 
ANY PURPORTED SERVICE of PROCESS, HIS PERSON ANn OVER PURPORTED 
SOBJECT MATTERS JURISUICTTON, ETC. (IRCP, Rules 4(i)(20, 12 
(4) & (5); Rule 4(b),(d)(2)" (CT 8-10 
From this date, on and continuing through the FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST 
JOHN BACH, filed February L, 2010 (CT 158 1 159~ assigned judge, 
the Honorable Gregpry W. Moeller, denied all mot~ons, affirmat-
ive defenses and counterclaims, many time unilaterally not 
addressed not supported by any of plaintiff's counsel's filings 
or supported arguments. District Judge Gregory Moeller, became 
biasedly and impartially an advocate and third attorney for 
Plaintiffs, to such a degree that his rreeiding over the hearings 
violateddefendant and counterclaimant's JOHN BACH's procednal 
and substantive rights of due process and equal protection. 
- 2 -
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant's specially a~pearing motion of may 27, 
2009 to strike, void any service over his person and purported 
subject matters jurisdiction, stated very pertinently: 
11 
• • bhe offered complaint is in fact unverified and 
the purported attached RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT, 
is per public policies considerations void, if cot invalid 
in the State of Idaho, is by its very tersm, paragraph 7, 
subject to: "Federal law and Montana law apply to the 
contract"; that facially/patently, defendant JOHN N. BACH 
specially appearing was never a signator, no cobuyer, nor 
anyguaranto, nor agent for deceased defendant CINDY LEE 
BACH, nor has any purported estate or personal represent-
ative been named herein of CINDY LEE BACH, deceased, if 
such representative does exist; that the purported "VERI-
FICATION" is by a wholly unknown and unqualified, nor auth-
thenciated person in the State of Idaho, of a properly 
licensed or formed corporation or as any purported agent 
for General Motors Acceptance Corporation, which purported 
statements of Kathleen Fitzgerald are utterly specious, 
hearsay, hearsay upon speciulationss and other hearsay, with-
out foundation or proper authenticaton and are completely 
void and/or invalidate.'said offered specious complaint; and 
that by its very terms of said form, does not disclose 
that either GMAC, if registered or licenses in Idaho, was 
intended as any loan creditor, nor that venue, place of 
State of formation, performance and jurisdir+ion.was ever 
intended nor agreed to be in Teton County, Idaho. Lastly, 
based upon the forestated lack of person and subject mat-
ter jurisdiction there is no action for Claim and Deli~ 
eryper I.C. section 8-301 nor that of foreclosure on any 
purported true sales agreement, or security agreement in 
sales transaction or lease in fact; which do not continue 
nor exist beyond the deaht of CINDY LEE RACH, now deceased. 
See Stockman Bank of Montana v. Monkota, Inc., (Mont 2008) 
342Mont 116 2008 MT 34. 180 P.3d 1125; Dillroe v. Devoe 
? 2 3 ~~ o n t 4 7 , 7 2 4 P . 2 d l 7 l ; a n d a l s o ~ c G·i l 1 v . L e s t e r , l O 8 
Idaho 561, 700 P.2d 964 1269, 111 Idaho 841. 
Were the personal, subject matter and law of Idaho ap-
plying issues resolved, to keep any jurisdictions in Teton 
County, Idaho, such being extremely doubtful, the purported 
plaintiff and all its claimed, unsworn agent$, etc., have 
failed to allege, of Idaho's U.C.C, section 9-l03(l)(d) and , 
the holdings of: Rockwell Inter. Credit Cor. v. Valley 
Bal!lk (Idaho App 1985) 109 Idaho 406, 707 P.2d 517. 11 {CT 9-10) 
3 
Despite defendant's request for the presence ind use 
6f a court reporter at all hearings before the Court, the 
district court denied such due to funds and the illness of 
its regular reporter. The Court's minutes of July 7, 2009@ 
2;12 p.m. (CT 14-17) and the Association of Counsel, filed 
after the hearing had concluded at 2:37 a.m, (CT 18-19) re-
veal the admission that only plaintiff's filed a "claim and 
delivery action to get possession of (the) vehicle." {CT 15) 
Appellant argued that: "Car was registered in Bozeman 
MT; was there for year and a half." ; "Concern is misuse of 
contractual agreement that does not exist in point of time."; 
"No where in agreement is there a provision where there is a 
foreign application of laws."; and "-until care was rergistered 
and relisted as secured collateral-there is not vehicle This 
is the woong court, wrong clause, wrong claim." {Ct 16) 
On July 21, 2009 the district court judge denied Appellant's 
motons to strike/quash service and to dismiss. (CT 20-24) Under 
DISCUSSION, Part l. the heading, "The Court has jurisdiction 
over Mr. Bach and the veiicle, the district court, crptically 
stated: II The court would further note that Mr. Bach, has 
not hesitated in the past to avail himself of the idaho Courts 
when seeking redress for alleged legal wrongs against himl Accord-
ing to the Idaho's 'Long A~m Statute,' Mr. Bach has submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the State of Idaho by owning real 
property in Idaho and transaction business here. Code Sec5-514(a) 
and (c)."(CT 21) 
(NOTE:The district court's unwarrant personal jab and criticism 
as aforesaid for exercising his rights and objections, a~d other 
misstatements and criticims of Appellant throughout memo's Decision 
and discussions, (CT 22-24, will be addressed, infra, but ignored 
4 
district court's objective responsibiliies and duties as stated in 
the Id ah o Su p e em e C o u rt I s r e c e n t ho l d i n g s f o u n d i n ~/ e s t ' s P a c . 
Reptr, 3rd Series, July 8, 2011, 252 P. 3d No. 3, pages 1255:.31, 
to wit: State of Idaho v. Lute, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257-59 (Opn by 
Burdic, Justice (Lack of jurisdiction found after illegaYvoid 
13 year served criminal sentence); Stafford v. Kootenai County 
et al 252 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Lack of jurisdiction and standing or 
capacity to proceed, etc); and Fuller v. Dave Callister, et al, 
@%@ P.3dl266, 1271-73 and 1274).) 
August 8, 2009, Appellant filed his ANSWER BY DFFENDANT 
PRO PER JOHN N. BACH, WITH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, and DEEENDANT 
and COUNTERCLAIMANT REQUESTS A 12 PERSON JURY TRIAL WILL NOT 
STIPULATE TO ANY LESS. (CT 25-30.) John Bach denied in all capa-
cities and conjunctively, disjunctively , jointly and alternat-
i v e l y II a l l a l l e g a t i o n s of p a r a g r a p h s ( l ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , ( 7 ) , ( 8 ) , 
(9), (10) and (11), or the validty, effectiveness or completeness, 
certainty or claimed agreements, provisions and insertions of that 
attached purportd retail inst~·lilment contract, purportedly executed 
by CINDY LEE BACH, now deceased, 10 North 27St., Bil ling, Yellow-
stone MT 59103." (CT 20) 
Appellant's ANSWER fhen per his paragraphs 2 and 3, denied 
further, Par. 2, the he "owes, is indebted to/for or has any ob l i -
gation or responsibility to pay anu sum or sums of either ~24,047, 
$2,490.00, $17059. 18, $13,175.00 nor $3,00, nor any other lesser 
sums or at all as claimed .. "; (and) 
per Par. 3, denies "that said complaint is one at all 'For Claim 
and Delivery, (I.C. Sec 8-301) and further so denies on the afore-
said basis/grounds and averments all and each paragraphs (a) through 
(f) of plaintiff's prayer, and expressly, specifically denies that 
plaintiffs has anyrights to recovery of possession of said 2007 
Chevolet Equinox, nor for any recovery of ~17,059. 1~ nor for any 
prejudgment interest of $4. 16 per day fron any commencement date nor 
at all; denies further, that plaintiff has any claim, right or 
abilities to have such vehicles sold at either public or private 
sale in anymanner nor in accorance with Article 9, Chapter of the 
Idaho Uniform Commercial Code, and futher denies on all aforesaid 
basis, that plaintiff is entitled to recovery nor can it recover 
all costs and attorneys fee incurred, in case of default or other-
wise whatsoever of the sum of $3,000.00 or any sum. 11 (CT 26-27) 
Under and in Appellant 1 s INDIVIDUAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, 
he averred specific legal and factual barred aswell as illegali-
ties and public offenses/ violations of public policies, per par-
graphs 4 through 8 .(CT 27-28) Affirmative defenses paragraph 9, 
set forth an additional and further issues, per subparagraphs a) 
through e). (CT 28) These five additional separate torts were: 
a) An unsafe, dangerous and defective vehicle, to operate 
in high alpine country, roads and highway arteries 
... (as)exist in Teton Counties, Idaho and Wyoming 
over and via Teton Pass and other highways through Yellow-
stone and/or Oubose, Wyoming, etc. 
b) A lemon vehicle under Montana laws-statutes. 
c) Breaches of express & implied warranties of fitness 
for particular pu' · ... rposes, of merchant1b1l1ty, etc under 
Idaho and Montana statutes- Mont EPA, MCA 61-4-502/3. 
d) Deceptive and unfair commercial practice of sales-finan-
cing under Idaho & Montana statutes, MCA 30-14-224(1) 
and.30-14-133(1). 
el Violations of Federal RICO Act, per interstate commerce 
transgression with 2 rrior overt acts of a jointly run 
enterprise, conspiracy and orqanization in fact, criminally; 
plus violation of the Idaho Racketeering Statute, by 
the current and other unlwful, unfair and corrput collec-
tion practices, which may require this counterclaim to 
be amended to initiate a class actionfor moneys so laun-
dered. (CT 28) 
Appellant's CDUNTEP.CLAIMS,"Tn conjunction, collusion. joint 
venture and civil conspiracy, etc., with General Motors and Resse-
ler Motor Company of Bozeman, Montans, along with other unknown 
counterclaim defendants .designated for now as DOES 1 through 20, 
per his paragraph 11, he incorporated his previous paragraphs l 
- 5 -
through 9, as separate counterclaims. 
Appellant's counterclaim's last three paragraphs, numbered 
ll through 13, Paragraph 11, averred that GMAC, "and those 
entities, persons, etc., acting ith it have slandered, both 
the title and ownership, possession, use and value of said Chevolet 
Equinox vechicle, and further, have crafted without anu mutual 
agreement having been entered, to falsely now assert, cliam and 
pursue an illegal, void and criminal act of seeking to collect 
moneys where there is no contract in existence to do so; such efforts 
being against counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH, who neither a signator, 
guarantor nor surety on the illeoal contract, no ionger existing."~CT 29) 
Paragraph 13 stated: 
"By design, manufacture and national and states' marketing 
efforts of counterclaim defendant and said entitles/persons acting 
in conjunction or with joint tortious relationships, built and 
sold a dangerous, defective and unsafe product which was sold to 
JOHN N. BACH's wife, to use over said high mountain roads and high-
ways. Counterclaim defendatn and its cofeasors failed to disclose 
that the automatic breaking system, the transmission and four wheel 
drive features, would not and didnot operate safely via road and 
s ea so n s ' co n d i t i o ns t h e re o n , n or m a 11 y e n co u n t e red i n I d a ho , Mon t a n a , 
l.Jyomi ng and other near states." ( CT 29-30) 
Paragraph 14 1 s language averred generally that the "proximate 
result ... did violate the rights of counterclaimant, and his 
wife when alive as to those claims set forth, in paragraph 9, 
subp.:iiagraps b), c), d) and e), of page 4, supra." (CT 30 ) 
GMAC's RESPONSE TO COUNTERCLAIM was filed Aug. 21, 2009 (CT 31-33: 
7 
Dec. 9, 2009, Respondent's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDMENT 
was filed. (CT 34-35) GMAC's MEMORANDUM IN SUPBORT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. "The basis and qrounds for this Motion (was)set forth 
in the (Respondent's) Memorandum in Support .. and is supported 
by the record and pleadings on file with the Court." (Ct 34) 
Respondent's Memorandum, contended Appellant per the 
Decree of Summary Administration re In the Matter of the Estate of 
of Cindy L. Bach, Teton case number 08-420 was awarded the 2007 
Equinox (misspelled as Equimax)and the Decree provide that John 
Bach "shall assume and be responsible for all indebtedness which 
might be a cliim against the estate.' An affidavit of Launa 
E. Burri in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
had a copy of the DECREE OF SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION (&15-3-1205(b)I .C.) 
attached thereto. (CT 35, 42-44) 
GMAC's memorandum claimed it was entitled to possession 
of the vehicle and in the last sentence before its eoNCLUSION 
stated: "lastly, the counterclaim filed by Defendant JOHN BACH 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should 
be dismissed.h (CT 40) No where in said memorandum nor in any 
document did GMAC's counsel address, set forth nor cite any argu-
ments, case or legal authorities of said statment, which appeared 
as a personal, biased and prejudical extra judicial involvement 
of the district court judqe violatino Apellant's substantive due 
process rights. (CT 40) Respondent's counsel filed no further affi-
davit and relief completely on the purported(invalid /inadmissible) 
verification of Kathleen Fitzgeral, an employee of Semperian, Inc., 
'1-)ho stated she "believes the facts therein stated to be true and 
correct." (Ct 4) 
8 
December 11, 2009 Appellant filed a Motion for Immediate 
Court's order Continuing Summary Judment, Jan. 5, 2010; 
and for Farther Immediate Order STriking Plaintiff's said Filings 
and it's Unverified/Unsigned Co~plaint, IRCP, Rules ll(a) Veri-
f i c a t i o n ; 5 6 ( c ) & ( g ) ; & l 2 ( f ') . ( C T 4 8 - 5 0 ) T h e b a s i s of s u c h 
requested continuance was due to Appellant's personal and family 
plans to celebrate Montenegrian Orthodox Church Christmas Festiv-
ities per the Gregorian calendar, Jan 4-8, 2010 in Southern Calif. 
(CT 48-49) 
In Appellant's such request and motions stated: 
" ... Earlier
1
this Court in its Memorandum DEcision denying 
Defendant's Mot,on to Quash Service of Process and Motion for 
Dismissal, dated Oct. 21, 2009, page 2, paragraph 2, thereof, 
'incorrectly'reached the conclusion that defendant had not rai-
sed any authorities for his oral argument that the plaintiff's 
complaint was unverified by an out of Idaho state, corporate 
(purported) agent, not registered nor licensed in and by Idaho 
law to so sign or purportedly verify said plaintiff's complaint. 
The statements by the court therein were never refuted by Plain-
tiff's counsel, and during oral argument, JOHN N. BACH, was both 
physically andmentally affected by a most recent 11 stroke, trobotic 
complete" which required his use of a cane and other prosthetci 
devises to appear at such oral heari~g; defendant was on said 
date still in throws of rehabilitative physical and speech ther-
apy for such strokeeffects." (CT 49) 
Appellant then, "after further reveiw and research" was 
submitting that Rule 11 (a), Rulell(c) and 56(c)(d) and (e) of 
the purported verification of plaintiff's complaint "mast be 
stricken as a matter of law and the entire motion for summary 
judgment is without jurisdiction, legal nor factual basis. citing 
among four cases, that of Evans v. Twin Falls Co., 118 Idaho 210, 
796 P.2d 87 (1990), cert.den. 498 U.S. 1086, 111 S.Ct. 960, 112 
L.Ed 2d 1048(199l)(must show sath as required per I.C. 51-109); 
and Tri-State Land Co. v. Roberts, 131 Idaho 835, 965 P.2d 195 (Ct. 
App. 1998) citing also to Rule 56(e) re form of affidavit~ 
a 
January 19, 2010 Ap~ellant filed further his OPPOSITION, 
REFUTATIONS& MOTION TO STRIKE, VACATE & DENY WITH PREJUDICE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIBN FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (CT 51-50) He further 
filed therewith his personal AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, consisting 
of five pages (CT 56-59) attached to which was his deceased wife's 
copy copy of a much different and incompleted, restricted terms 
and verbal conditions of effectiveness, The Clerk's Transcript has 
an incompletf:,iphotocopy as CT 60). 
Appellant has ob~ined an verified copy of the complete 
document which Cindy L. Bach signed, without any agreemett, commit-
ment or anyaddendum whatosever, that GMAC was the financing credit 
entity. Such certified copy is made a part hereof, as APPENDIX 
ONE, to this APPELLANT"S OPENING BRIEF, on the right inside last 
cover page hereof. Said APPENDIX ONE is a corrected and replaced 
page CT 60 of the Clerk's Transcript herein, 
Within APPELLANT's s~~d OPPOSITION, REFUTATIONS & MOTION 
to Strike Plaintiff's Summary Judgment were three (3) complete 
p a g e s ( C T 5 4 - 5 6 ,} " ma n y u n p r ,J v e n a n d s u p p o s e d l y r e q u i r e d n o t 
just averred fact, to wit: 
"l. Does GMAC have standing, as it is now a matter of 
common knowledge and elgal fact that GMAC IS IN BANKRUPTCY? 
2. Did Cindy Bach ever sign a completed contract of agree-
ment with RESLLER MOTOR CO. of Bozeman for the purchase 
of what she specified she wanted in a vehicle she sought 
to purchase? 
',3, What written authority did Cindy Bach execute with and 
for GMAC, withfull knowledge of what GAMAC was financing? 
4. When, how and per what recording, registering or filing 
in both the States of Montana and Idaho did Cindy Bach 
ever consent in writing to a security interest or right 
to be held by GMAC in the vehicle she did purchase? 
l 0 
5. Under what showing of both specified personal know-
ledge and qualifications did supposedly an employee 
(Kathleen Fizgerald) of Semperian Inc, possess and 
utilize, to pruportedly sign the verification of the 
complaint? (The District Court both in error and haste 
in its conclusions assert forth in its Memorandum 
Decision upon whicn Plaintiff reliefs. See Mobley 
and Sons, Inc-~-v~-weave~ (Mont. 2009) 218 P.3d 472 
specifically a-t PAGE 472 !attorney's affidavit flawed and 
functionally defective, as his being, "familiar with 
the facts herein,~ was clearly testifying to information 
provided by his client, the veracity of which he had no 
:personal knowledge."); also: State Far.m Fire and Cas. v. 
Forced Aire (Utah App. 2009) 202 P.3d 299, 303-304 (Con-
tractor's affidavit in o~~osition to summary judgment 
based on his own person knowledge and created material 
genuine issues of fact which m~re than precluded grant-
ing of any summary judgment; credibility and wPight of 
evidence is for a jury to decide. 
6. Did theform agreement, a true copy of which is attached 
to JOHN BACH's Affidavit hereto, meet the public policies 
of Montana or was it such of unsonscionabilities, coer-
cion, fraudulent practices, etc? 
7. If GMAC does not have either standing, capacity to sue 
or even an secuirty interests in said vehicle WHAT 
IRREFUTABLE FACTS AND IDAHO LAWS OR STATUTES ALLOW IT 
NOW TO SEEK REPOSSESSION AND RESALE WITHOUT ANY STATED 
ACCEPTABLE CURRENT C0MMERCIBLE REASONABLE PRACTICES?" (CT 54-5E 
The AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, offered Jan 10,, 2010 in e,pposit-
ion to Respondent's summary judgment motion(CT 58-57, par. l 
ahd 2~ set forth his legal attorney and law practices qualif-
ications ofover 28 years of practice in commercial code repos-
sessions of vehicles, tractors, mobile homes, motor bike, snow-
mobile, etc.,, for the testimony -he gave via said affidavit. 
In his paragraph 3 (CT 57-58,) ge testified: 
11 1 personallyaccompanied, driving Cindy L. Bach, my 
wife, to Ressler Motor Co., of Bozeman, Montana and 
was present personally during the discussions and neg-
otiations conducted aad had on or about January 6, 2997, 
as U recall a S~turday, No representatives nor officers 
of GMAC were present nor took part in such discussions. 
Most auspiciously, the officials of Ressler Motors were 
agreed that it as the selling dealership would finance 
personally the vehicle to be sold Cindy, as one of the 
owners of Jackson Hole Aviation, where Cindy was the chief 
11 
accountant and human resources director, was a personal 
friend of the owner of Ressler, and would guarantee any 
payments. At. no time was GMAC to be a lender nor fin-
ancer of the vehicle to be purchased by Cindy, and for 
this reason GMAC was never identified nor state nor 11 XX 11 ed 
in any box or blanks as financing the vehcile. For such 
reasons, the vehicles was to be registered and licensed 
in Montana, Bozeman, using beth Ressler's and Jackson 
Hole A+iation's local Bozeman addess or post office box. 11 
"4. Attached hereto is a complete, accurate and unaltered 
copy of the document signed by Cindy Bach which reveals 
the numerous blanks which were neither completed nor re-
ferenced in anymanner for financing trhoug GMAC." (CT 57-58) 
The attached copy received by Cindy Bach, did not have 
the handwritten numbers, as was contained on the copy attached 
to the Complaint such missing numbers of 11 02 /9/0434159". (See 
Page 1, supra last sentence of first full paragraph.) 
In Appellant's CLOSING BRIEF RE SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION 
TO STRIKE, DENY & VACATE WITH PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed Feb. 1, 2010 (CT 63-75) he stated and 
argue that: "The contract form which CiNDY L. BACH singed has 
been more than falsely altered, misrepresentedand even per 
the inadequate verification of the complete for purposes 
of consideration supporting any plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, has established a deceit, fraud and abuse 
of legal process byplaintiff and its attorney upon this 
court and defendant JOHN N. BACH,. 11 
Most significantly the choice of law clause which plain-
tiff seesk to apply was never stated in its forged/fraudu-
lent copy of the supporse written agreement. In Milanovich 
v, Schnibben, 2007 MT 128, 337 Mont, 334, 160 P.3d 562, 
it was held~ .. that under Montana Law forum selection clau-
ses are 1 pri~faciJ.valid 1 , So, if the Plaintiff's copy of 
the forged and falsified written agreemtn was admissible 
and relevant .. , then the Montana forum selection clause 
for the action tobe tried in Montana is valid and this act-
tion should have been filed in Montana .. But Milanovich, 
supra, has more cognent application because it also held that 
if the resisting party can ~Row that the clause is unreason-
able under the circumstances, to wit: that 'the agreement 
is not 'deliberately and understandingly made,' and if the 
contract langugge does not 'cleraly, unequivocally and un-
ambiguously express a waiver' of personal jurisdiction', 
12 
t h u s be com i n g / being a co n t r act of ad h es i o n , es p e c i a l l y 
"when a party possessing superior bargaining power• 
,nresents a standardized form of agreement to a party wbose 
· c~oice remains either to accept or reject the contract withou~ 
t h e o p p o rt u n it y t o n e g o t i at e i t s t er m s . 11 Z i gr an g · v . U . S . E a n -
corp Piper Jaffray, Inc. 2005 MT 282, 329 Mont, 239, 123 P.3d 237."' 
(CT 64-65) 
Appellant further pointed out Plaintiff had tJ expressly 
stated under penalty of perjury with specific factual details it 
it had complied within four (4) months after the vehicle was 
kept and required to be licensed in Idaho, citing I.C. 28-9-801, 
28-9-708 and also 28-9-304 & 307. Plaintiff haa not pled and 
c?uld n?t· ~lead it had a~y sec~r,ty interest perfected by Idaho 
laws. J;C. 28-9-3 2)c), subparts, (d)(e)(f) and (g)(2) and 28-
28-9-316(a) (CT 66) Section 28-9-316(a) provided: 
"A security interest perfee.ted purauant to the law of 
the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301 (1) or 
28-9-305(c) remains perfected until the earliest of: 
.. (2) The expiration of four (4) months afer a change 
of debtor's location in another jurisdiction; or (3) Tee 
expiration of one (1) year after a transfer of collateral 
to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located 
in another jurisdiction ... (b) ... If the security1 int-
erest does not become perfected under the law of the other 
jurisdiction before the earliest tiem or event, it become 
unperfect and is deemed neve to have been perfect ... 11 
(CT 66-67) 
Attached to Defendant's Closing Brief were a confirming 
Feb. 10, 2010 Letter request from Appellant to the IDABO SEC-
RETARY OF STATE WITH COPIES OF FILED (RECORDED DOCUMENTS THAT: 
l. SEMPERIAN, INC. , File Number C 161651, had file 
A CERTIFICATE OF WITHDRAWAL from doing business in 
Idaho. 
2. The Application for Withdrawal of SEMPERAIN, INC., 
WAS GRANTED AND IT CEASED DOING BUSINESS AS A CORPOR-
ATION IN IDAHO, Septeber 26, 2008. (it had surrend-
S~pe~ i2~ a~ca@rity to transact business in Idaho, 
• ' ,J (CT 68·75) 
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A SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, Pro Se, was 
filed February 19, 2010, which attached as EXHIBIT "2" the 
foregoing letter and Idaho State Secretary of State CERTIFICATE 
OF WITHDRAWL, per I.C. sec. 30-101520 of SEMPERIAN, INQ.,(CT 79-81) 
Appellant's FURTHER EMORANDUM BRIEF RE: To Strike, Vacate, 
Etc., Witb Prejudice Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion was 
filed February 19, 2010. (Cf 82 - 89} Appellant sought sanctions 
against Respondent's counsel per IRCP, Rules ll(a}(l} and Rule 
56(g} on the basis that such a,torneys knew that the verification 
by Kathleen Fizgerald was a sham. stating expressly: 
"WE do not know what was the exact employee position of 
Kathleen Fitzgerald with samperian, Inc., if she was so 
employed. But she dated and signed her one parge verif-
ication, two whole days before Laura E. Burri prepared the 
complaint and signed it herself. To conclude that neither 
knew that Semperian, Inc., was disfranchised of its ow~ 
accord from doing or conducting any business in Idaho is 
ludicrous, especially since Ms. Burri practices in Boise, 
Idaho and could have ascertain upon reasonable inquiry 
that Semperian, Inc., had no standing, capacity or auth-
authority to do business in Idaho. Ms. Fitzgerald, if she 
was a key and relevantly mangerial employee would have 
known that as well. But for this Court to make such in-
quiries of both said women requires their prewence before 
this court with the rights of due process and equll pro-
tection assured deeendant to personally cross examine them 
on the record. Ms. Burri, aavoids any appearances before 
this court other than the associate counsel, who appears 
further progrmed to ,,m1slead and deceive this court."(CT84-85 
Appellant further in said FURTHER MEMORANDUM BRIEF, pointed 
out that IRCP, Rule ll(c) expressly requires/states who must 
verify the pleadings when a corporation is a party, to wit "by 
an officer thereof" and especiallu when a purported verified 
pleading is to be used as a basis for an affidavit to support 
a summar- judgment motion the "a verification upon personal know-
leged is required." (CT 85} 
1 4 
Appellant in his FURTHER MEMORANDUM BRIEF, cited POSEY 
v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO, 141 Idaho 477, 11 P.3d 162 (Ct. App. 
2005) where "it was hled that although a witness' affidavit 
for the corporation offerd to support a summary judg,emt ~ption 
was conclusionary absent any foundational showing his partiaipa-
tion in the transaction or his indeed personal knowledge of 
the facts which he oversaw and a~tested; insofar as any documents 
pffered tb show the truth of assertions contained within them, the 
documents were hearsay for w~ich no excepton was established."(CT 86 
Besides raising and citing the failure of compliance with 
Idaho's Statute of Frauds, I.C. 28-2-201(1), 28-2-209(2)(3) amd 
I.C. 9-505(2) as Cindy had not signed for financing with GMAC 
per her incomplete document (CT 60 and APPENDIX ONE hereto, 
the Complaint fails to state a cause of action and can be dismissed 
with prejudice "upon the included basis that defendant's said 
motions, oppposition ememos and requests, are also a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, per I.R.C.P, Rule 12{c) in his favor 
and against plaintiff." (CT 88) 
Appellant's said FURTHER MEMORANDUM BRIEF, in its last 
two (2) pages, sterting with the last full paragraph on CT 88 
highlights and sets forth four ( 4) ·m.or,e cont ro 11 ·j ng cases, three of 
the Idaho Supreme Conrt and one, Tomer v. Gates, from the~9th 
Cir., CA 1987) 811 F.d 1240, 1243, holding that party's failure 
even as late as oral argument, to withdraw his motion for summary 
judgment which was frivolous was not only unbecoming, but not 
to be taken lightly by the Ninth Circuit court as to its ruling 
and award of sanctions. (CT 88-8,Q) 
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C. GRANTING OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FnR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF PIDSSESSICN. 
May 3, 2010, the district court filed its MEMORANDUM 
DECISION, CONSISTING OF9 PAGES. (CT ,90-98) The DISCUSSION. 
there i n s tat e s per " 1 11, " GMAC ' s s um mar y j u d gm en t mot i on i s 
granted!' At the bottom of said page (CT 93) is stated: 
"At issue in this case is whether Mrs. Bach's demise 
affe~ts GMAC'$ ability to enforce the 88nract. As 
we discussed ,n the Court's July 21, 2 9 Memorandum 
Decision, Mrs. Bach's deaht did not leave GMAC without 
remedy to enforce the financing agreement. The Court 
previously held: (l) the Court has in personam jur~s-
diction over Mr. Bacb and in rem jurisdiction over. 
the car; (2) GMAC's complaint was properly verified; 
(3) Mr. Bach was properly served and is a proper party 
to thesuit; (4) Mr. Bach assumed for Mrs Bach's financinq 
agreement when he assumed indebtedness and claims against 
Mrs. Bach's estate. lO" .. 10 Memorandum Decision of July 
21, 2009 Denying Dft's Motions to Quash Serv •. of Process & for 
Dismissal." (CT 93) 
The district court judge then reviewed (more than selectively and 
biasedly, Appellant's issues raised by his counterclaims, but claimed 
"These are conclusory allegations", when Respondent had made no 
fromal summary judgment motion on the Countercl?'m;, affirmat-
ive answers and issues raised. (CT 94-95) 
~~~ta~~n§al~sFJt~i~~gePS~~~!~rg~e8fa~h~ ~g~t~hd 0 tslBmed 
the obligation of the agreement on December 1 2008 
when ~ud?e Luke signed the Decree of Summary idmini;t~a-
t ion. " 
The district court then, without further analysis or citation 
to case authorities "dismissed (Bach's counterclaim in its 
entirety. But there were numerous counterclaims which it did 
not address. 
1 6 -
A1though there was no summary judgment motion made re 
the counterclaims, and no requests for any tried with finality 
judgment, the district court took 11 judicial notice that it is 
dangerous to drive in many places in Idaho during winter, including 
Teton County, This is true whether one is driving in an Equinox 
or a Snowcare. Mr. Bach's mere assertion that there are braking and 
four-wheel-drive problems with his vehicle in Teton County is in-
sufficient to allow GMAC to form an answer or put them on notice 
as to complaint. Such claims do not meet even the liberl pleading 
requirements of Rule B(a}(l} and 9(f} of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
P(locedure. 2011 (CT 96} 
(NOTE: At this point and per the disrict court's giving of his 
asserted credtble evidence, expertise at that without any founda-
tionbeing presented, he lost all standing as an impartial jurist 
and was required to immediately recuse and disqualify himself, 
but not without first vacating and striking all his memo decisions 
and rulings against Appellant. 
(CT 96-97). 
May 17, 2010 DEFENDANT & COUNTERCLAIMANT JOHN N. BACH, filed 
Four POST MEMORANDUM DECISION MOTIONS. (CT 99-107) Appellant 
also filed therewith a FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. BACH, re lack 
of standing and capacity of GMAC due to the undispute existence of 
GMAC's bankruptcy and the lack of GMAC to "show 1tending and 
capacity to pursue their sole claim and delivery action." (CT 108-09) 
Appellant filed a FURTHER EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
MOTIONS FILED May 17, 2010. (Ct 110-0114) As this Idaho Supreme 
Court reviews de novo this appeal from the granting by the dsst-
rict court,without following or being bound in any manner by 
the district court's Memorandum Decisions or rendered Judgment, 
Appellant's entire FURTHER MEMORADNUM IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTIONS 
FILED May 17, 2010 are attached hereto following renumbered as 
pages 18, 19,20, 2.1, and 22 hereafter. 
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,T0HN N. BAC!-i' S '?• lRTHR.R. 
~mMORANDUM IN SU1?'PORT 0,;, 
HIS MOTIONS FILED Mav 17. 2010. 
DA'F.E:: ,Jul. 6, 2010 TtME: 2o. m. 
PLACE: Teton County Courthouse 
This 1:i'URTHE:q MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP ALL THE MOTIONS 
filed by JOHN N. BACH, Pro Se, on May 17, 2010 is Presented 
in view of the absolute lack and avoidance of any resoonse 
by nlaintiff GMAC and its counsel. ,JOHN N. BACH'S motions 
should be all granted as without onnosition or refutations, 
oer mmtion for reconsideration and Rule 60 (b),. all cited subsections. 
I. THE ENTIRE MEMORANDUM DECISION Or' Mav 4, 2010 SHOULD 
BE SET ASIDE, VACATED AND ANNULLED. 
The .Memorandum Decision of :\.iay 4, 2010 neither final 
either as a judgment nor final order with jurisdiction of 
subject matter, nor with any personal jurisdiction and most 
certainly, is without any statement or averment of any viable 
claim or cuase of action; most certainlv it is not state 
any claim whatsoever for claim and delivery I.e. 8-301.(DS-
soite the Court's predisoosed mindset that "it is uncontested" 
ti1at Cindy Bach "financed" said vehicle with GMAC, such has always 
been contes , refuted and disoroven by the affidavits and motions 
of JOHN N. BACH, who is neither a cosigner, nor guarantor, nor 
indemini er nor hold harmless nrornisor to GMAC who in two §tates, 
wilfully & intentionally failed, refused to per t any security int-
of the vehicle in ~ontana and Idaho!) 
I'll 1" A.0.B. P. 18 . 
. J~·mACH' s F"u:::-thr Mern re His rsw - f_f 1 ed ~1ay 17, :-?01() o. l--. 
A. BASIC:·:RULES, PRINCIPLES WHICH APPLIED BUT 
WERE )]QT FOLLOWED BY THE JUDGE HEARING PLAIN-
TIFF'S SU1'1.MARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
1. A Pro Se litigant is entitled to the same applic-
ation of the rules of ~ivil procedure and controlling stat-
utes, in the same manneE as apply to a licensed Idaho attorney. 
The judge did not do so herein. Shelton v. Shelton (Idaho 
2009) 225 P.2d 693,6~~99(Judqe herein created unique proced-
ural hurtles, dealing with summary judgment and motion to dis-
miss re ilure to state claim)?lt's counsel's ~iilure to show 
any perfection of security interest per his offered cooied 8 naqes 
of Montana's statute 61-3-103, (1) (d), comnlier col'l1Itlents narts 
(5) &"'(6), required the granting of fendant summary judgment!) 
2. The subject mtter jurisdiction issue mav be raised ·at 
any time, sua sponte or otherwise. T .. J. T. , Inc ,v. Mori ( ldaho 
Apti!l 10, 2010) 230 P.3d 435, 436-437 (S/J motion separate 
judqment per Rule 58(a) .) The district court's ignoral of fur-
ther refusal/failure by nlainti£f to orove anY securitv oerfect-
ion ner Idaho statutes in the Idaho regis vehicle in quest-
ion, further doomed any right/basis oer Rilile 56(a) through (e) 
to grant summary iudqment to olaintiff & further showed no viable 
claim of claim and aeliverv shought by olainti 
3. Due process, both procedurally and substantively re-
quires a fair and impartial judge who cannot become either an 
advocate for plaintiff GMAC, nor an expert or percipient wit-
ness either disclosed nor sua sponte, nor give and apply his 
expert testimony w1thout filing of notices such intent, 
his exoert qualifications, foundational bass, etc., all of 
which must be heard, determined and ruled upon by another 
quali ed trial judge on all evidentiary quali cations basis, 
with fixed/focused ap?lication of exclusion re hearsay, unfound-
ed opinions, speculations, inadmissible and nonrelevant state-
ments, etc. f'Mlsey v. I.A.C. (2005) 141 Idaho 125; C'.a-perton v. l\.T. Massey 
Coal, Jun. 8, 2009, U.S. Suorerre Court Dkt 08-22, 556 U.S. ___ ; Litkey v. 
U.S. (1994) 510 U.S. 551. 
SPEX:IAL 1>l'0rE: Under I.R.E., Rule602, 603, 703, 704 and 705, the quali-
fications of any exoert must be evidentiarv and foundationailv':Bstiatlil.tshed 
for any exrert ooinion or testirrony to be given, as is stated. by the dist-
court judge when he "takes judicial notice that it is dangerous to drive in 
many nlace<::: in Idaho during the winter, includinq Teton Countv. This is true 
whether one is drivinq in an Equinox or a Snowc:at." (Menu flecision, P. 7) 
Nhat is the iudqe's quali.fication to rnaJce such sneculative, hearsav an.d 
irrelevant/inadmissible sua soonte oroof/evidence in aidinq nlaintiff and 
dismissinq all counterclaim causes of: action in one Alice in Sro.-,land swcoo? 
\.bst egregiously, where/when 1vas such judicial notoo facts determined in liti-
qation & when did .John Bach be qiven i'I. hearing to refute such, i::ier IJ:IB, 201, e-
4. Where issue of what are the terms of a contract, sec 
nreliminarv showing bY plaintiff must/is required that anv 
enforceable contract must be slifficientlv definite, certain and 
its terms and requirements so ascertainable of acts to be Per-
formed and when cerformance is required, complet~br not by 
the plaintiff; not only must any uncertainties or .,ar:Jb1qu1ties 
ot a contract be identified but the court must implv the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealin into the contract to be Performed 
by the plaintiff seeking to enforce it. Spokane Structures, Inc. 
':L........ Equtjab]e In:irestment (Idaho 2010) 2267:>:Td 1263, 1266-68); 
JNBACH I s Furthr Me.rro re Iris Mtn.c:; rfl 1.,l :v!u 7 7 -:in 1 " ,-, 11 " D n , " 
Potlach Educ. v. Potlatch School Dist. (Idaho Feb. 3, 2010) 
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (interpreting ambiguous term issue of 
fact)>.arid11281 (court must implv covenant of good faith and 
fair dealings.in all contracts ~hich raises and is also a 
question of fact). 
T]T. IF THE DISTRICT COURT WRONG:1:<'ULLY DISMISSED ALL C.:OUN'!'E~-
CLAIMS, WHEN NO RULE 12(b) (6) MOTION WAS PROPERLY MADE 
NOR SUPPOR':T'ED BY ANY REQUI>IBO 1-IB.110RANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 
BY PLAINTIFF, SUCH DISMISSAL MUST BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
TO COUNTERCLAIM.ANT TO l<ILE AN AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM. 
Counterclaimant's causes of action des~ite the wording and 
unsupported conclusions of the dis judge, 5-8 are 
more than inaccurate; they reveal the prejudici mindset of 
the district judge, who should no lonqer ores over this action. 
At oage 5, the district judge, without any basis of case authority 
states:' ":Perfection and recording issues would af t GMAC' s rights 
as to other ere di tors, but would ha11Je' mo,-'ef feet on Mr. Bach's 
obligation to pay under the contracts." 
Such conclusion is more than specious and a red herring non se~uitor. 
GMAC filed solely a claim and delivery action per I.C. 8-.vn. It 
has not stated any other c~uie of action and must show it has-not 
only standing as a oartv aqreed to by Cindv Bach, but that it timelv, 
as required further adequately oerfected its security interest under 
both .1v1ontana and Idaho laws; which it admitted did not. 
The further unfounded conclusions at oaoe B, too paraqraoh 
of said Memorandum Decision, narticular sentence thereof, that: 
"There is nothing in the record to suggest GMAC has been 
fraudulent or devious in its efforts to receive oavment under 
the financing agreement."; (are wholly inaccurate!) 
Indeed the facts and evidence presented by JOHN BACH have shown 
exactly that; moreover, the attemot by G~AC's counsel to mislead 
s Court per the coov of '·1ontana statute 61-:3-103 (1) (d), corrunents 
(5) & (6), that somehou it is excused from oer ctinq its claimed 
security is beyond not just the orovisions and rules of ao~lication 
,mBACH 's Pur. ~1le.rro re His ~1tns f i l en '10:r ~ 7, 2010 P. 3. A.O.B. P. 20. 
Rule 56, particularly, Rules 56(a) through 56(e). 
Further, the other statements, top page 8, are beyond 
the issues of said Rule 56, as ther1d.i!strict court judge is not 
hearing evidence in/after a trial and ruling, Toe is restricted 
to what plaintiff has either been able to show or cannot show 
at this stage,of a limited suffiffiary judgment request. No where 
in GMAC's complaint does it allege, the vehicle was/is plooged 
to it and it has always had and still has actual possession of 
it to enforce that pleage. Thusly, the very absence of any security 
perfection dooms any viable cause of action by GT-1..Z\.C for cla.ii.m and 
delivery. Here, the district court's very own words show/establish 
that GHAC did not and cannot show·.it had all elements of olaim and 
delivery which is strictly a statutory remedy based solely upon 
a timely and legally perfected security interest! Aardema v. U.S. 
Dairy Systems, Inc., 2009) 215 P3d 505, 513; Thomas, Idaho, 126 
Idaho at 531, 887 ~.2d at 1038. 
When now the district court assumes an att0r,ney's advocacy 
role for GMAC as to facts and arguments which are bevond what the 
record shows and is requ.ired for summary judgment rules' aoolication, 
in short, legally covering <V1AC' s misuse and abuse of orocess per 
no basis whatsoever for claim and delivery, then, how can said 
same district judge preside o*er a jurv tri~l, which is·the entitle-
ment right of JOHN N. BACH?? Nor does, the reoeated, but inaccurate 
conclusion, that by "Mr. Bach assumed both the benefits and obliga-
tions of his deceased \vife's estate" eliminate with clarity, exact-
ness and unambiguity, that he guaranteed all her debts, even those 
unenforceable and not legally binding? It isn't CINDY who now re-
fuses BOBICA posturinq- - it's her surviving husband who asserts 
all riahts that she had and those which he has a0ainst such wilful 
,Jl\JBACH's Pur Memo re IIis Mtr01fJi-!:d ~-1ay 17, 201') P. 4. A.OB. P. 21 
deceptively abuse of orocess and extortion by GMAC, who has 
shown no rights nor basis to be granted any summary judgment. 
If the district court is any where close to accurate 
that somehow "Mr. Bach's counterclaim is dismissed in its en-
tit~ty 11 , such should be without prejudice to filing an amended 
counterclaim, which may include dece~tive and illegal business 
practices by GMAC and even its counsel of record herein. The 
terms of the contract signed by Cindy Bach with ~be Equinox dealer, 
retained her right to sue it and any assignee,, GM.AC, under "1ontana 
and U.S. federal laws and statutes. Lastly, as no security nerfection 
has been established, GMAC is not entitled to any form of attorney fee1 
If it is to take back said vehicle it must be in full satisfaction!,, 
III. ALL THREE MOTIONS MADE BY JOHN :'J. BACH SHOULD BE GRAN'!'ED 
AND THE DISTRICT COURT ,JUDGE DECLINE TO HEAR ANYTHING 
FURTHER IN THIS ~1ATTER A._ND HAVE AN JUDGE ASSIGNED. 
DATED: July 2, 2010 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING: I the undersigned hereby certify that on 
July 2, 2010 I did mail copies of this document via U.S. :First 
Class Mail to: Judge Gregory Moeller, C/0 Madison County Court-
house, Rexburg, ID 83440; Laura E. ri, P.O. Box 2774, Boise, 
ID 83701-2773; and Lance J. Schust 05 Corona~o , Idaho 
Falls, ID 83404-7495. 
/ ~ 
A.O.B. P. 22 
,JNBZ\CB's Fur. Merro re His Mtns ffi1114 17, 2010 (See Ct 115- 119) 
Julf 19, 2010 Plaintiff's filed a RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN._ 
BACH's POST SUMMARY JUDMENT MOTIONS. (CT 120-124), and an 
unnotarized/unverified A AFFIAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN BACH's POST SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS. 
(CT 126-128) Plaintiff's counsel also filed an AFFIDAVIT OF COTS 
AND PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, ON July 26, 2010. (CT 129-;30) 
August 2, 2010, DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLOSING BRIEF 
RE OBJECTIONS, WITH MOTIONS TO STRIKE GMAC's LATEST FILINGS, 
PURPORTED AFFIDAVIT, ETC. -OF LAURA BURRI, Et Al. (CT 131-
Appellant objected to the consideration or receipt of Laura 
Burri'sunnotarized/unverified affidavit (CT 120-124) as not only 
inadmissible but untimely, must be striken and denied usage. 
Moreover, appellant objected the said affidavit was false and 
an attempt to dilatorily amend the plaintiff's summary judgment 
motion and offered in respons to Ap~ellant's said post aummary 
judgm-ent motions without obtaining a formal order after motion 
being made to permit such further unnotarize/unverified affidavit. 
(CT 134-137) 
On August 5, 2070, an AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF"S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHN BACH"S POST SUMMARU 
JLIDMENT MOTIONS was filed without leave of court, nor any 
order filed, argued and granted to do so. (CT 138-·;40) This 
umaithorized, late and inadmissilbe affidavit had a purported 
ITO sheet of "7/79/2010" of CINDY's E€fuinox, with 44,000 odo-
meter miles on 2/29/2008 was listed, but no information when, 
whether orif, within four (4) months of registered with an Idaho 
license, an claimed security interest/lien on it was prefected--
the information was more than useless, irrelevant and sp~~ula-
ti· e hearsJy., conjecture and entirely inadmissible. (CT 140 ) 
September 3, 2010 the district court filed an AMENDED .. 
t,l{~ORA~DUM DECISION, (CT l4l-155)which more than repeated 
the Court's prior decisions, except it now denied Appellant had 
been denied a fair and impartial judge (CT 142~15Jland denied 
his Motion 
l 5 5 ) 
Strike Lauri Burri 's two untimely affidavits. (Ct 152-
23 
D. FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED AND NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 
A FINAL JUDMENT AGAINST JOHN BACH, was filed February 1, 
2011, ordering money damages tota11ing $19,976.94 with 
i n t ere st at 5 . 3 7 5 % per annum, a ., \~ R IT , of Possess i on sh al l be 
issued for therecovery of possession of said vehicle." (CT 158 _159 ) 
The WRITOF POSSESSION has issued and the vehicle has 
been repossed inMarch 2011 but no notices of any sales, auctions 
or biddings for resale of said vehicle or if any price or moneys 
have been received nor if applied against the total moneys due 
per the Final Judgment. 
On March 15, 2011 Appellant filed his NOTICE OF APPEAL 
.. . & APJ?.Ul O F A P P E L L A N T S I D E F E N DA N T S C I N D Y L E E B A C H , ( d e c e a s e d ) , a n d 
JOHN NICHOLAS BACH, an individual (widower). (CT 160-164) 
Despite Appellant not having received timely and proper 
NUTIFICAT!ON of when his opening brief was due, he received les s 
_n,an eight days ago that his OPENING BRIEF IS DUE PER FIRST CLASS 
OVERNIGHT MAILING, tefore midnight August 2, 2011. 
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I S S U E S 
APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL AND APPEAL OF CINDY L. BACH 
(deceased) and JOHN NICHOLAS BACH, an individual (Widower), sets forth 
seven (7) general issue, at CT 16 2-163. All said seven (7) 
issues are revised, but included within the followina issues on Appeal: 
ISSUE NO. l. w~s TKERE ANY CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT FORUM CLAUSE THAT 
.JI , I, . ' 
REQUIRED JURISDICTION AND VENUE TO BE IN MONTANA? 
ISSUE NO. 2: WAS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR CLAIM AND DELIVERY PROPERLY 
~~RIFIED TO BE USED FOR PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
ISSUE NO. 3: WAS THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE AUTHORI7ED BY SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RULES TO PERSONALLY AND WITHOUT ~OTICE AND ,, 
A PROPERLY HELD DUE :PROC~SS HEARING, TO GIVE HIS 
HEftRSAY EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH HE USED AND APPLIED 
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
IS~UE N0.4:DID GMAC, mislead, abuse the processes of the 
DISTRICT COURT AND FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
REQUIRING THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT APPELLANT 
A FAVORABLE J~DGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS? 
Before argument on these four (4) issues 
and the many subissues raised by the original seven (7) issues 
included therein from Appellant's said NOTICE OF APPEAL, Ap~el-
LANT , A PRO SE LITIGANT i entitled to the same application of the 
statutes, rulesand authorities cited and controlling, in the same 
manner as apply to a licensed Idaho attorney. Shelton v. Shelton 
25 -\-1'2~J 
(Idaho 2009) 225 P.3d 693, 698-699. The trial court judge 
herein herein created unique proceedings and misinterpreta1,0HS 
of statues and civil rules of procedure in dealing with 
GMAC's unverified motion for summary judgment and ignoring 
refusing to rule on Appellant's motion to dismiss complaint with 
or grant him a motion for judgment on the pleadings re failure 
of GMAC to state a cause of action to perfect in Idaho, timely 
and oroperly any perfection of its unsupport perfection of 
a secuirty inter(.si I.C. 28-9-312(c), (d)(e)(f) & (g)(2); 
28-9-316(a) CT pages 10 through ?.2 are incorporated herein. 
Throughout the district court's rulings and memo decisions, 
he cited and used the Decree of Summary Administration, Dec. l, 
2008as a matter of law that appellant thereby had received pos-
q 
session of the Euinox and assumed the oblisgation of the agrement 
~ 
that CINDYLEE BACH had entered into when she purchased the car. 
Butthe district court never ruled nor addressed the conflicting 
evidence of what agreement signed or nonintegrated Cindy Bach 
reached with RESSLER MOTOR CO and GMAC. Ct pages 14-17 are epecially 
incorporated herein 
Two (2) recent Idaho Supreme Court cases were violated 
by the district court's more than delibarate oversights, to wit: 
l. Fullerv.Dave Callister (Idaho, 2011) 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 
( "The party aginst whom the (summary) judgment will be entered 
must be given adequate notice and an opportunity to demon-
strate why summary judgment sbould not be entered. It is 
also true that a district court may not decide an issue not 
raised inthe moving party's motion for summary judgment.") 
The foregoing last seneence of Fuller. requires the reversal 
of thedistrict court's granting of GMAC's unmade, unargued 
and wholly unsupported motion to ~ismiss with prejudice all 
of Appellant's affirmative defenses and numerous counter-
claims against GMAC.) 
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Fuller also involved an ssignment of the purchase 
agreement. (Here, GMAC never per its motion for summary 
judgmetn, unverified, ever proved conclusively or 
ptjerwose. that the Decree of Summary Distribution, ever 
expressly or otherwise, constituted a waiver of and 
intentional relinquishment of all known rights of 
Appellant to resist, oppose and have the GMAC 1 s unver-
ified complaint dismissed with prejudice. Fuller, 252 
P.3d 1266, 1273 ( A novation differs from an assignment 
because it requires the assent of all parties ... An 
assignment is not a debt; & is full payment for something 
now, even though receipt of part of the value may occur in 
the future. An assignment is a formal transfer of prop-
erty orproperty rights fron one to another, while a 
w a i v er i s the i n tent ion a 1 re 1 i n qui sh men t of a known r i g ht . 11 } 
Appellant never sought nor has he waived any of his 
known rights of opposing, defendant and aefeating the limited 
and unlimted claims of GMAC. 
2. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment (Idaho 2010) 
226 P.3d 1263, 1266-68} 
(Not only must any uncertainties or ambiguities of a contract 
be identified, and determined which terms and conditions 
apply,but especially, the court must imply the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealings into the contnact to be performed 
by the plaintiff seeking to enforce. All of the foregoing issues 
are of fact to be decided by a jury where required by either 
party. (Appellant required per his answer, affirmative def-
enses and multiple counterclaims, a jury trial of 12 persona. 
(CT 25} 
Most reelvantly, J.C. 15-3-1205 (c} 1 s wording does not 
extinguish, nor relinquish, waive nor destroy Appellant's constit-
utional rights to refute, oppose and defeat GMAC's current complaint. 
Any such interpreation by the district court that it does is more 
than erroreou; itis constitutional "VOID" Fidelity STate BAnk v. North 
Fork Hwy Dist. 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449, 31 A.L.R. 781 (1922} 
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It is further applicable that the Appelllnt,s·jury 
trial rights are guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution 1 s 
Article I, Clause 7. Moreover, any waiver of jury trial, 
as that of wiaver/relinquishment of a claim, ~rosecution or defense 
thereof, cannot be made or enforced except in the manner prov-
ided by stature; such cannot and will not be implied in doubtful 
or contested cases. Neal v. Drainage Dist. No. 2, 42 Idaho 624, 
248 P. 22 (1926) 
Through all hearings, the district court judge more 
than confusingly but deliberately accepted the purported verif-
ication of BMAC 1 s complaint by KathleenFitzgerald, which oath was 
not as required by I.C. 51-109; was not as a proven officer/ 
director of Semperian, Inc., per Rule 11 (c); and was 3) as an 
unspecified agentor employee of Semperian, Irle, then disenfranchised 
and withdrawn from being an Idaho corporation and doing via such 
corporation any business in Idaho . (CT 66-75, 79-81) 
The following two (2) cases apply throughout all issues 
raised infra, as do all arguments and authorities, pages 18-29 
supra, lwhich l:y such reference are incorporated herein, infra as 
applicably supprtinq 111 issues 1 resolution tn Appellant's favor: 
1. Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co, 141 Idaho 477, 11 P3d 162 
!Ct. app. 2005(A witnesses affidavit for corporation 
offered in suppoort of summary judgment motion was 
conclusionary and without any foundat~onal showing of 
his precise participation in the transaction or of his 
acquiring or participating to acquire personal know-
of the facts, etc., such was inadmissible hearsay 
in violation of Rule 56(b) through (e). 
2. Mobley and Sons, Inc. v. Weaver {Mont 2009) 218 P.3d 
472! 475 {attorney 1 s affidavit flawed as hersay, def-
ective, he was clearly testifying to hearsay evidence 
provided by his client.) 
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ARGUMENTS ON IN SUPPORT OF 
All ISSUES 
ARGUMENT ON ISSUES NO. 1: THERE WAS A COUNTRACT/AGREEMENT FORUM 
CLAUSE , THAT REQUIRED GMAC'S 
COMPLAINT FOR CLAIM AND DELIVERY 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE, TO BE IN 
MONTAN!\. 
It was undispute:i that CINDY L. BACH went to Bozeman, 
Montan ona - Satu rday, driven there by her husband , Appel-
lant JOHN N. BACH. She purchased an Equinox that day and 
reached a totally unintegrated agreement Per GMAC's 
pagenated/recopied version of the Reta1i Installment Sale 
Contract, ,parag;-aph 7 provided : "Federal 1 aw and Montana 
law apply to this contract. (CT 7) 
Any contract between Ressler Motors and Cindy was 
reached in Bozeman, Montana, where such aurchased car was 
registered for at least a vear and a half or mnre. If GMAC 
wa " the financier it knew tha t CiNDY' s address was: 
1 (D N o r t ht, 2 7t h S t . B I L LI N G S Y E L L O SJ, 0 N E M T 59103. CT 6) 
NOTE: Because of the unexpected breakdown of Appellant's 
IBM Selectric II. Typewriter Appellant reques~ an additooal 
hr e ( ) w ek to 'in~sh +hi~ Opening Brj~f and Replace it 
w i t h a f u 1 1 c om p 1 e t e O P E N I N G B R I E F O T H ~R W I\ E , A p p e 1 1 a n t S U p M I T S 
ALL HIS ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES, PAGE\ Pages \ through 29, 
1 
i n s u p p o r t o f al 1 1 h i s i s s u e s s t a t e d h e r e i\n 0 1 / " , 
1 
/[· .,,,. ~ .. 
' /I / [ {/_,2;, 
DATED: August 2, 2011 at approximately//, ]l'1fr "')oon;t' BACH,, / 'f'. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify, that on August 2, 2011, 
I did place in separate first class mail envelopes copies of 
this APPELLANTS' OPENING RRIEF to: (1) Seven (7) bound and 
one unbound copy, via ov~rnight mail delivery to; CLERK, 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT, Post Office Box 83720, Boise, Idaho1 
83720-0101; and Two (2) copies to Laura Burri, RINGERT LAW 
CHARTERED, P.O. Box 2772, Boise, ID 83701-2773. 
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WHAT IRREF'UTABLE FACTS A.1\J'D IDAHO LAWS OR 
STATUTES ALLOWS IT NOW TO SEEK REPOSSESSION 
AND RESALS WITHOUT ANY STATED ACCEPTABLE CUR-
RENT':COMMERCIBLE REASONABLE PRACTICES? 
Defendant and counterclaimant, recently had prior-
ities of getting ?repared for two (2) oral appeal arguments 
before the Idaho Supreme Court, which have impacted him 
adversely from further de neations of his opposition and 
refutations he n. He will be filing sup?lemental memoran-
da and affidavits before the hearinq date and time set now 
bv the Teton County Seventh Judicial District Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, this January 16, 2010. 
per. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN~- BACH 
I, JOHN N. BACH, also known as JOHN NICHOLAS BACH, Hereby 
being placed under oath to testify as stated herein, do so: 
1. I give the testimony herein of my own personal knowledge, 
involvements of attendance and presence at the times stated 
or events identified, my own personal 9articination as a 
former trial attorney and advocate of over 28 vears 1n Calif-
ornia, and other neiqhboring states of Nevada, Oreqon and 
005G 
vJashintgon, ardin adrrJ±n:t-;ttrative law- tr.:j>bunall?. pe;fpre 
Californ:i:a Adn)±nis·t:r;a tive Law· Revi-ew Tribunals and various 
Fe.deral Departments: an.d Aqenc 
tn Wash±ngt6n, De Cr venues. 
2, I have taught advanced ~us 
in California and personally 
law courses at California 
State Un.jye;t",$::,i:ty, Chico, Cal±f ~, upper division, for both 
II 
busj.':ness- and accounttn9' majors, with emphas·is on the earlier 
' Unifo;rm Sales A,ct, and the Uniform Commercial Codes of Calif., 
and adjo.j::nd.m,g states:, the latter U.C.C. act which is now in 
place and apply-i_ng in Idaho~ Additionally over some 28 years 
o~ pl,a_cticer, a_s:- a t:r:r.jl:er,l advocate and ;i:n related administra-
t.i:ye t;t;'ials·,. :,: re9;r:-esented new vehlcles- dealerships, tractor 
and f a]:',m i.mplement dea,lershi-ps·, mob;i:.le hoTI!e manufact1:J:r:e1;s ::tadd 
reta.r:'.l, ,mo:b:j::le home and trai,lor sales dealershios, espcially 
reposS'essions: ~nd the hold;ing of commerc lly reasonable resales 
fo:r:- purposes· of s:ecurin9 payments- to my- dealerships clients. 
l haye handled both appeals, anbltrat±dns and mediations 
and resales as required 
under the corn:mercial. codes, i:ncldu:i::ng but not limiterl to the 
bas;i.c requirements· of fj:-li\ng Form l., signed statements, security 
;i:nte.re.s ts in veh±cles, tractors, mob±le hom'fS:, tra± ldrr, motor 
b.j.\kes, enow:mob;iles, etc. Al though never licensed in Idaho to 
practice law, I have attempted to and have keot current with 
recent decisiDns and st t t · 
au es 1n Idaho, Montana, California and 
other states in the field of financed goods purchased. 
3. I personally accomoanied, d ing Cindy L. Bach, my wife, 
to ~essler Motor Co., of Bozeman, Montan and was pre t . " · sen 
,JNB's OPP, REFTNS, & MI'N ro ST!fl'ff~7t's --S/J roes n. 7. 
lJet'sonally during the discussions and negotiations conducted 
and had on or about January 6, 2007, as I recall a Saturday. 
No representattires nor offieers of GM.AC were present nor 
took part in such discussions. Most auspiciously, the offi-
cials of Ressler Motors were agreed that it as the selling 
dealershio would finance personally the vehicle to be sold 
to Cindy, as one of the owners of aaakson Hole Aviation, 
where Cindy was the chief accountant and human resources 
director, was a oersonal friend of owner of Ressler, ·and 
would guarantee any oayments. At no was GMAC to be 
a lender nor financer of the vehicle to be purchased by 
Cindy, and for this reason GMAC was never identified nor 
stated nor "XX"~d in any box or blanks as nancinq the 
vehicle. For such reasons, the vehicles was to be reqistered 
and licensed in Montana, Bozman, using both Ressler's and 
Jacon fHole Aviation's local Bozeman,address or that of their 
mutual Bozeman's attorney's address or post o ce hox. 
4. Attached hereto is a complete, accurate and unaltered 
copy of the document signed by Cindy Bach which reveals the 
numerous blanks which were neither com?leted nor referenced 
in any manner for financing through GMAC 
5. There are many other parts and subjects of the discussions 
which I not only overheard but 9articipated re such vehicles, 
but at this ju~cture; such are not anorooriate nor to be infor-
mally in-jected. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF Teton 
DATED: January 19, 20101 
I, the undersigned NO~ARY PUBLIC 
of the State of Idaho, County 
do hereby affirm, acknowledqe, attest, verify 
and state, that on Satursday, Jan. 1 ·, 2010, in 
,et6n61 County, Idaho, JOHN~- BACH did appear, 
was made personally known to me, was ola·ced by 
me under oath, and after being administered the 
oath, he did qive his personal testimony as set 
forth in his AFFIDAVIT, SIGNING THE SAME IN 111.Y 
PRESENCE AND WITNESS THEREOF, this Januarv )9 
2010. SO SWORN TO AND 
10, 2010. 
1,,\\\\\\\\lll l//111,,, 
#''" ? J'l..Rk€'''¾ 
'i$ /'J...t:t- •.• ....... ,<;> ~ 
~ ~- .. .. ~ :i§l..r.} ,•' ny •,. ~ 
-::::-- ... o:'i.P..n \ ~ 
::::~ ·~ ·- ~ 
i { jo ~ 
-::::-.. • C, • -
\ •••••• pus-S _./$ $ 
z •. ., A'~ 
% &,-;···· .. ·a··~~-# 




CERTIPICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL: I the undersigned 
hereby certifv that on January 1~, 2010, I did nlace 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with 
exhibits attached thereto, in an envelope with first 
class postage affixed thereto, addressed to ~lainti 's 
counsel, Laua E. Burri, ngert Law Chartered, P.O. Box 
2772, Boise, ID 83701-277. 
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RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT 
GMAC FLEXIBLE FINANCE PLAN 
Dealer Number Contract Number 
Buyer (and Co-Buyer) Name and address (include county and zip code) Creditor (Seller name and address) 
{;H)\' LEE. BAGI 
r.:rn 27TH ST 
.n °.~'- YELLmISTDHE IH 59103 
'ESSLER r!OTOR COMP:Uff 
lit l1AHI 
lOZEMA.N Ml 59 71 S-0400 
You, the Buyer (and Co-Buyer, 11 any), may buy the vehicle described below for cash or on credit. By signing this contract, you choose to buy the vehicle on ere, 
under the agreements on the front and back of this contract. You agree to pay us, the Creditor, the Amount Financed and Finance Charge according to ti 
payment schedule shown below. We will figure the Finance Charge on a daily basis. · 
New or Used Year Make and Model Vehicle identification No. Prima Use for Which Purchased 
EW 2007 




The cost of your 
credit as a yearly 
rate. 






FEDERAL TRUTH-IN-LENDING DISCLOSURES 
FINANCE Amount Total of Payments Total Sale Price 
CHARGE financed The amount you The total cost of 
The dollar The amount of will have paid after your purchase on 
amount the credit provided to you have made all credit, including 
credit will cost you or on your payments as your downpayment 
you. behalf. 
j _,,",, ~~.~ed:.':d. of$ 3nnn no 1--- ·- ,__ is ~ t~O':I ") nn ,,0 .o!t\ A 7 .... ,.. 
D personal, family, or household D agricultural 
D business D 
Insurance. You may buy the physical damag 
insurance this contract requires (see back) fror 
anyone you choose who is acceptable to us. You ar 
not required to buy any other insurance to obtai 
credit. Your decision to buy or not buy oth; 
insurance will not be a factor in the credit approv 
process. 
If anv insurance is ChAC:kF!rl hAlnw nnlirioc 
'" anb uoI::ieUJJO/UI e7 ·sopesn soIn::i)4a11 ap saJopeJdwo::i eJed e)nD 
· · · :uo!le1sueJ1 4s1ueds O , ·1uawJ;ed moli 10 0 ()rlJ 01 dn anp siunowe Jn410 11e pue a6m4'.) o,nJeU\:I at.n JO \Jed pr 
j 
RETAIL INSTALMENT SALE CONTRACT 
GMAC FLEXIBLE FINANCE PLAN 
Dealer Number Con1rac1 Number 
Buyer (and Co·Buyer}- Name and add 1es$ {include county and zip codej Credi\ot (Seller name and add1ess) 
T: ; [ t ~! .. ~! :1 
'·i , / ;; : _j j 




You. the Buyer (and Co-Buyer, if any/, may buy the vehicle desc11bed below 1of cash or on credit By signing lnis con1rac1. you choose to buy the veh,cJe on ;::ft:c 
under the agreements oo the front and back of th1~ cori1ract You agree lo us, the Credilor, lhe Amounl Firanced and F nance Charge according 10 lh 
paymenl schedule shown below. We will figure lhe Finance Charge on a 
Prima Use for Which Putchased 
D peisonal, lamily, or household O agricuttural 
C business O 
y t d our ra 1Hn 1s a: y ., e Maire Mooe! 
FEOERAl TRUTH-IN·LENOING DISCLOSURES Insurance. You may buy lhe physical aaff\age 
Total of Paymenl!o Total S.0:1• Price 
insurance this conlract requires {see back:J ffQfT) ANNUAL FINANCE Arrioun1 anyone you choose who is acceptable lo us. Yol..i are 
PERCENTAGE CH.o\RGE flnance-d T>ie amount you The 101a1 co.st of not required to buy any other insurance to obtain 
RATE The dollar The amount ol will have paid atter your purchase on credit Your decisioo !O o, no! buy othec The cost of your amoont the credit provided lo you have made all credit, including insurance will not be a lac\or the credit approval 
credit as a yearty credit will cost you or on your payments as )Ql.Jf downpayment process. 
rate you behaij. scheduled. o!S 'q,-!'' r!C is If any insurarice is checked below, policies o, 
,'1 ''•l % s ;rn ~ nn s'>MHZ 11[1 1.;,,:,;,,,n nr, $ • ·nn ·':ti cet11f1Cales !tom the named insurance companies will 
Your Payment Schedule Win 9e: 
describe the terms and COf\dihons, 
I Number I of=ts] W'len Payments 
' 
.~;.:!. I Check the insurance you want and sign below: ol Pavments Are Due Optional Credlt Insurance. 
I ;,;, ,s ;'~··· (,n ! Mon!hlybeginning,, lf\U mt, i l 
C: Cred,1 Life· C: Buyer 0Co-8uyer OBoth I I 
D Credit Disabillly !Buyer Only) 
Pr&µayrnenl If you pay oN all your debt earty, you wiU not have 10 pay a penalty. 
Seocurlty lnterHt. You are f)iving a secunty inleres! l'l !he veh1Cle being purchased. 
. u 't, 
' -
Additional lnfQf'matlon: See this contraci !or more lnlormatio..'1 including inlormaoon about 
Credit Disability $ 
nonpayment, defauit, any required repayrnenl in lull before lhe scheduled dale, anti secunty interest I if, 
{insurance Company) 
ITEMIZ.o\ TION Of AMOUNT flNANCEO I A 
(Homa Ottice Address ) 
1 Cash pricl:! (1ricluding any accessories, services, and taxes) ~;' j ! ,I ,;,: P) Credit hie insurance and credit disability insurance 
2 TolaJ downpayment =- (It ne~!ive en1er ·o· and see line 4H below} are nol required lo obtain credit Your dec•sicn 10 
Gross 1:ade•ln S dlt\ -payoN byseller s Pf" buy or not buy :redil life insurance and credit disabihly insurance will not be a in t.he credit =- net !r~S·lf1 $ n Lt• + casn $ ,nnc llfj approval process. They l'llll no! provided unless 
+ other (descri~L ... s 11 ·lj -·-s ;·i.t:,, "•f( [2) you sign and agree to pay lhe extra cost Credi! life 
J Unpakl balance of Cash price (i minus 2} ~' ,r, (31 insurance pays ooly the :1mount yOtJ would owe 11 
4 Othe, charges i11eludlng a-nounts paid to others on your behalf (Seller may 
you paid a!I your payments on lime. Credit disability 
,nsurance does nol co1,er any mcrease ,n your 
keep part of these amounts,)· payrnent or in the 11umber of payrne,.1ts. Coverage 
A Cost of opt!Onal credit insurance paid lo the Insurance lor credd lite insurance <1nd credil disability 
company or companies insurance ends on the original due dale for me lasf 
U!e s I.'.~ paymeni unless a dil!erenJ term for !he insurance 1s 
-~isabihty $ 'J/,1 s shown below ~·-~ 
8 Other Insurance paid to the insurance c;-Of't"lean~ $ }'J:\ --- Otner lnsuranc•, 
C Officfal fees eaid to 2overnment ag_enc;es $ ,.,,.\ d' ·, ., 
0 GovernMent taxes not ·,ncluded in cash Q:rke s "I A 
;_,, ___ 
Type of Insurance Term 
E Governmenl license and/or tegist1at10n !(Hits 
Premium S '} I ~ s _ ... ..!i.J.Jt-. __ 
F Go1ternrnent certificate of tltte fees i I' 
{iriclude-s:S ,., securi!)i: tnteresl recording; lee) s ,.,., (lnsurance Company} 
G O!h~r chaige-s {Se!le1 mus! tdenlity who is paid and 
descri~_purpos(t.) \Home Otfice Address) 
'"'t! torn .-,nn s, ; ;11: I want the insurance checked above. 
to , '°' s '' X ~PO-'.G!~ ll>f:l: P: $ .,n ,n Buyer Signalure Date 
to ' fop' s n X 
to," fo,, s " 
Co,Suyer Signalure Da1e ··-
Jo,\ /or $ ~ ANY INSURANCE REFERRED TO IN THIS 
H ~ Qillc'.Qff~ ~ . S -----.1!+"---= CONTRACT ODES NOT INCLUDE COVERAGE 
S, 14) T olal other charg:es and arnounls oald to others on i'.our behalf "' f;r,. FOR BOOllY INJURY ANO PROPERTY 
5 Amounl finaricea (3 + 41 __ ,i,,;,<,::: j5l DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS. 
HOW THIS CONTRACT CAN BE CHANGED, nus con1rac! contains lt\e enlire agreement between r0u and us relaflrlg lo 1h1s contract Any change :o '.he 
contract must be in wntmg and we must s19r ii No oral changes are binding 
~erS~sX ----~-----~--------(2J:_~uyer Sig,_n..csc..Xc__ ________ _ 
H a'ly part ol trus con1racl is no! valid, aH other pans stay valid We may delay or refram !,om enforcing any ot our 11ghts under ih;s conlrnt::t w1tt.ovt losmg \~~rt1 
Fo, example, we may ex1end the trne !cw making some paymenis wi!houl extending the t•me for making ottie11, 
Su back for other imporlllt'II agreements. 
1. Notice to lhe buyer. Do not sign lhla contract before you read it or if It contains any blank spaces, 
2. You are enUtled to an exact copy of the contract you sign, 
3. Under the law, yo<; have the right to pay off In advance the full amo<;nt due and lo obtain a partial refund of the 
finance charge. 
Tiu• Annual Percentage Rate may btJ negotiable with the Seller, The Seller may assign this contract and retain its right 
10 receive a part of the Finance Charge. 
You agree to the terms of this contract. You confirm that before you signed this contract, we gave it to you, and you 
were free to take it and review II. .You confirm that you received a completely filled-in copy when you signed it. 
Buyer Signs :( Dat~.I'.lfiL'..UJll __ ._ 
Co--8uyer11 11nd Other Ownets - A CO·bvyer ,s a person who •s resPons1bie tor paying ~wnet 1s a pe:son 
lr'le vi,hide but does no! have lo pay the debt The other owner agrtes to !he s-ecunty 111;ere.st in l~e ve>i1c1e given 10 us 1n th1s con1rac1 
2109 f-R MT 1012006 (Fo1 use 111 t~e State of Moniana) l ul 4) 
Cc-pyrighl 2006 GMAC, AH H19h1s Reserved 
~~·~·---,- -----··· 
Notice: See Other Side 
OUAOPUPUGATE (,RIGIHAL · 'JM.£.C FILE COPY 
I 
OTHER IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS 
1. FINANCE CHARGE AND PAYMENTS 
a, How we wlll figure Finance Charge. The Finance Charge 1s figured 
on a dally basis at the Annual Percentage Rare on !he unpaid par1 of 
the Amount Financed. 
b. How we will apply payments. We w,11 apply each paymenl f1~! lo the 
earned and unpaK:I part of the Finance Charge, and then 10 the unpaid 
pa.rt al the Amount Financed. 
c. How late payment• or early payments change whal you must pay. 
We based \he Finance Charge, Total of Paymen1s, and Total Sale 
Price shown on !he Iron! on the assumprton that you will make every 
paymenr on the day it Is due Your Finance Charge. Total at Payments, 
and Total Sale Pnce will be more it you pay lale and less 1f you pay 
early Chan9es may take the form of a larger or smaller l1nal paymenl 
or, al our optJon, more or fewer payments of lhe same amount as your 
scheduled payment with a smaller rinal payment. We w,11 send you a 
nolice lelhng you about these changes before !he final scheduled 
payment LS due. 
2. YOUR OTHER PROMISES TO US 
a, If lhe vehicle is damaged, destroyed, or missing. You agree to pay 
us all you owe under this contract even 11 the veh!de 1s damaged, 
destroyed, or missing. 
b. Using !he vehicle. You agree no! lo remove the vehicle lrom lhe U.S. 
or Canada, or to sell, rent, lease, or transfer any rnleresl 1n the vehicle 
or this contracl w1lh0UI our written perm1ssf0n. You agree nol to expose 
the vehicle lo misuse, seizure, confiscation, or involuntary transfer. rr 
we pay any repair bills, storage bills, taxes, lines. or charges on the 
vehicle, you agree 10 repay the amount when we aslil for it. 
c. Security interest You give us a secur,ty 1nteres1 tn: 
1. The vehicle and all parts or goods installed in 11; 
2. All money or goods received (proceeds) lor the vehicle; 
3 AU insurance, maintenance, service, or olher conlracts we finance 
for you; and 
4. All proceeds rrom insurance, rnamlenance, service. or olher 
contracts we finance for you. Thrs includes any refunds al 
premiums or charges lrom the contracts. 
This secures payment of all you owe on lhis con1rac1 II also secures 
your other agreements in Lh1s contract. You w1I/ make sure !he title 
sl1ows our security inlerest (hen) in lhe vehicle. 
d. Insurance you must have on the vehlcle. You agree lo have physical 
damage insurance covering ICJss or damage fa the veh1ele for the term 
al this conlract. The insurancG musl cover our interest in the vehicle. If 
you do no\ have this insurance, we may, ir we decide, buy physical 
damage insurance, If we dedde to buy physical damage insurance, we 
may either buy insurance 1hat covers your inleresl and our 1nleres1 ·1n 
the vehicle, or buy insurance lhal cavers only our inleresl. 1r we buy 
e11her type of insurance. we will tell you which 1ype and the charge you 
must pay. The charge will be the premium for the insurance and a 
finance charge at the highest rale the law permrts. 
!I the vehicle 1s lost or damaged, you agree thal we may use any 
insurance settlement to reduce what you owe or repair the vehicle. 
e. Whal happens to returned insurance, maintenance, service, or 
other contract chargea. If we gel a refund al insurance, mainlenance, 
service, or other contract charges, you agree thal we may sublract the 
refund lrom what you owe. 
3. YOU MAY PREPAY 
You may prepay all or part al 1he unpaid part al the Amounl Financed a1 
any time without penalty. II you do .'iO, you must pay !he earned and 
unpaid par! ol the Finance Charge and an other amounts due up lo the 
dale of your payment. 
b. You may have to pay all you owe al once. If you break your 
promises (default), we may demand tha1 you pay all you owe on 1h1s 
contract at once. Defaul1 means: 
1. You do not pay any payment on lime; 
2 You slar1 a proceeding in bankruptcy or one 1s slaned against you 
or your proper1y; or 
3. You break any a9reements in !his contract. 
The amount tOU w~I owe w1U be the unpaid part o1 the Amounl 
Financed plus the earned and unpaid part of the Finance Charge arrd 
any amounts due because you defauJled, 
c. Yoo may have lo pay collecllon costs. Ir we hire an attorney who 1s 
nol our salaned employee lo collect whal tOU owe, you w,11 pay the 
attorney's reasonable lee and court costs the law permits. The 
maximum attorney's lee you will pay will be 15% ol lhe amount you 
owe. 
d. we may take the vehlcle from you. II you default we may takE 
(repossess) !he vehicle trom you 11 we do so peacelu41y and the la~ 
allows it. II your vehicle has an electrOl"IIC tracking device, you agree 
that we mar use the device to find the vehicf.e, II we take the vehicle 
any accessones, equtpmenl, and replacement parts W'III stay Wlth thi 
vehicte. II any personal 1lems are in the vehicle, we may store them lo 
you al your expense. If you do not ask for lhese items back., we rna 
dispose of them as the law allows. 
e. How you can get lhe vehlcle bacl( if we lake It. II we repossess thf 
vehicle, you may pay to ge1 11 back (redeem}. We w1/l !eU you how mud 
lo pay to redeem. Your nght 10 redeem ends when we sell lhe vehicle. 
We will sell the vehicle if you do not gel II back. If you do no 
redeem, we will sell the vehicle, We wilt send you e wntten notice o 
sale belore selltng the vehk:le. 
We will apply the money !rorn lhe sale, less allowed e)l(penses, 10 tht 
amount you owe. Allowed expenses are expenses we pay as a direc 
result ol taking the vehicle, hcid1ng ii, preparing ii !or sale, and selling 11 
Allorney fees and cour1 cos1s the law perrmts are also aillo""e( 
expenses. II any money 1s let1 (surplus). we will pay il to you. If mane~ 
lrom the sale is not enough lo pay the amount you owe, you must pa• 
the rest lo us. It you do not pay this amount when we ask, we ma• 
charge you rnleresl al lhe highest lawful rate untll you pay. 
g. Whal we may do about optional insurance, maintenance, ser,iice 
o, other ,;ontracts. This contract may contain charges 10< cpl.Jona 
insurance, maintenance, service, or other contracts. If we reposses 
the vehicle, we may claim benehts under lhese con1,acts and canu 
them 10 obtain refunds of unearned charges to reduce whal you owe a 
repair the vehicle. II fhe vehtcle 1s a total loss because ii is confiscated 
dainaged, or stolen, we may cla11n benelits under these conlracts a~ 
cancel them 10 obtain refunds_ of unearned charges lo reduce what yo1 
owe. 
5. WARRANTIES SELLER DISCLAIMS 
Unless the Seller mal(es a written warranty, or enters Into a service 
contra,;t within 9-0 daya from the date of 1h19 contract, the Seller 
mal(ea no warrantiss, express or implied, on Iha vehlcle, and there 
wlll be no Implied warranties of merchantability or of fitnese for a 
particular purposa. 
This prov1s,oo does not affect any warranties covering the vehicle thal the 
vehicle manufacturer may provide. 
6. Used Car Buyers Gulde. The Information you see on the window forr, 
for thia vehicle Is part of this contract. Information on the- wlndov 
form overrides any contrary provieiona In the contract of sale. 
Spanish Translatlon: 
Guia para compradores de vahlculos usados. La informaciOn que v1 
SUPt?LEM:i;:NTAL CERTIPICA'I'~ O:r;' 
S!':-qvrcE BY r1AIL 
I, the undersiqned here~v suonlement and further 
certifv service uoon oonosinq counsel, this January 19, 
2010, necessitated hecause of the absence of a Notarv Public 
on Saturdav, Jan. 16, 2010 in the business area of -qexburq, 
~ain Street, due to the Martin Luther King extended holidav, 
and the obtaininq of a Notarv ?ublic's signature and Seal, 
this Date, Tuesday, ,Tanuary 19, 2011) in Teton County, from 
which Driqq's ~ain nost nffice I did mail a comolete coov of 
the foregoinq document of now 10 paqes in a se~arate envelooe 
with attachments thereto, with fi s~ class nostaqe affixed, 
addressed to: Laua E. Burri, Rin er\Law Charter, ?.O. Box 
2772, Boise, Idaho 83701-2772. \~/\"'-- -.._/,) /}! /!w (}"-v 
DATSD: January 19, 2110· 1// ~ 
( 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
Coooly ol Teton ) ss. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY !hat the above and 
'°'8golrig II a ful, true and OOffllCt copy of 
lhe ot1glnel theteof, ~ tile In my office. "- It:~ 1L 1:t¾0~ 
&/ tVtJt ,tu, 
DepijtyClert( 
n 10. 

